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Abstract
We investigate delegated investment management in private pension accounts using data
from Australian accumulation (superannuation) funds. In Australian non-proﬁt pension
funds, trustees choose investment managers on behalf of members. We ﬁnd that funds with
many delegated managers have higher risk-adjusted returns than those with few. However
funds with 13 or less specialized managers show no improvement over funds with a single
diversiﬁed manager. All do worse than a benchmark portfolio of asset-class indices. Further,
by using random selection to mimic the choices of an uninformed individual choosing from
the same menu of delegate managers as used by trustees, we show that returns from pension
funds with large numbers of trustee-selected managers compare favorably with returns
from randomly selected, equally weighted portfolios. However this improvement falls oﬀ
quickly for funds with fewer trustee-selected managers, or when randomly selected portfolios
are also diversiﬁed across asset classes. Results indicate that an uninformed individual
following a naive diversiﬁcation strategy would have done as well as most trustee boards in this
sample.
1 Introduction
As retirement income systems around the world move away from deﬁned-beneﬁt
arrangements towards privately managed accumulation plans, participants are
increasingly being compelled to make selections from menus of investment options.
Consequently, issues of increasing concern in many countries are how pension fund
investment menus are constructed and composed, and the degree of responsibility
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falling to individual fund members for investment choice. Recent studies show that
inadequate or poorly constructed investment menus can result in dramatic
ineﬃciencies.1
A distinguishing feature of Australian arrangements is that among not-for-proﬁt
superannuation (private pension) funds, the choice of investment managers is
delegated to trustees and their consultants. Individual members of superannuation
funds allocate savings to investment managers indirectly through an entry-level
choice from among multi-manager diversiﬁed and specialist asset allocation options.
Trustees then pass the investment task on to groups of specialized investment
managers. This practice raises questions as to the eﬃciency of direct, as opposed to
delegated (or decentralized), choice of investment funds, a question of increasing
urgency and relevance in many pension systems.
Here we report on patterns of delegated or decentralized investment choice in
the Australian not-for-proﬁt superannuation sector. We investigate whether this
additional layer of management, where trustees pool contributions and then disperse
them among selected investment managers, creates value for retirement savers. In
particular we look for answers to four questions: Is there a pattern of increasing
beneﬁts to members as the number of delegated managers (mandates) increases?
Can returns from the selected investment managers span a group of standard asset
indices? Do trustees choose managers with more skill than an uninformed individual?
Are beneﬁts, if they exist, passed on to members’ accounts via realized crediting
rates?
Using new and unique data on almost two hundred not-for-proﬁt private pension
(superannuation) funds and their investment delegation patterns, we measure the
relative performance of funds which delegate to many investment managers against
the performance of similar funds which employ fewer managers, and against simple
portfolio formation strategies. We ﬁnd that funds where trustee boards employ a very
large number of investment managers generate higher risk-adjusted returns over the
(three-year) sample than other superannuation funds; results for funds with 13 or
fewer mandates (managers) show no improvement over, and may do worse than,
funds employing a single diversiﬁed manager. Returns from funds with large numbers
of mandates compare favorably with returns from randomly selected portfolios,
but this improvement falls oﬀ quickly for funds with fewer mandates, or when
randomly selected portfolios are diversiﬁed across asset classes. Trustees’ selections
generally do not improve on the choices of an uninformed individual who randomly
chooses one manager for each major asset class, then builds an equally weighted
portfolio.
We begin with a review of the theory on decentralized portfolio management
(Section 2), followed by a description of the current practices in investment del-
egation by not-for-proﬁt superannuation funds (Section 3). Section 4 describes the
database of superannuation fund investment portfolios we use for testing, outlines
the empirical tests and presents results. Section 5 concludes.
1 See Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) and Brown and Weisbenner (2005).
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2 Decentralized management in portfolio theory
Ineﬃciency in decentralized management can arise from incomplete information
transfer between the central manager and delegated managers. In a CAPM world, all
investors observe the market portfolio’s risk and return characteristics and can
achieve maximum eﬃciency using two-fund separation. Where private information
exists, however, investors may be able to generate returns above a passive benchmark
by hiring well-informed active managers. In practice most active managers choose to
accept direct control of a portfolio allocation rather than selling private information
sets to clients because such information can easily be on-sold. At the same time
central managers propose fee structures that are designed to reward accurate
predictions and penalize mistakes by the active managers.
Nevertheless, the central manager must deal with the task of combining delegated
portfolio subsets into an eﬃcient centralized portfolio. Most of the literature on
decentralized portfolio management investigates rules and incentive structures which
a central manager can use to achieve eﬃciency when not privy to the full information
set of the delegate managers.
Sharpe (1981) deﬁnes the decentralized portfolio selection process as an extra
level of diversiﬁcation. He distinguishes diversiﬁcation of judgment where a central
manager selects more than one delegated manager to mitigate any serious individual
prediction errors, but where delegated managers can choose from all available
securities, and diversiﬁcation of styles, where delegated managers analyze a discrete
subset of securities. The potential for selecting eﬃcient centralized portfolios varies
with these diﬀerent types of diversiﬁcation.2
Sharpe derives eﬃcient myopic decision rules under three conditions: ﬁrstly,
passive and active delegated managers analyze an overlapping set of securities ;
secondly, all managers agree on covariance predictions; and, thirdly, any delegated
manager predicts each element of the set of returns with the same level of accuracy. If
these conditions hold, the central manager diversiﬁes across judgments by combining
delegated manager portfolios according to their assessment of each delegate’s general
predictive accuracy. The resulting combined portfolio is eﬃcient under myopic rules :
each active manager simply chooses a minimum variance portfolio subject to their
own predictions, the passive manager chooses a minimum variance portfolio subject
to consensus predictions, and the central manager creates a weighted average of all
delegated portfolios depending on their personal evaluation of each active manager’s
accuracy. To make this work, the central manager does not need to know active
predictions of individual portfolio returns.
If the problem is restricted to the case where managers optimize over non-
overlapping subsets of securities (i.e. diversiﬁcation of style), Sharpe argues that
myopic decision rules are usually not optimal, even where there is consensus about
the covariance of asset returns. A ﬁrst-best outcome cannot be attained in one step,
and he proposes a two-step process, where one active manager myopically optimizes
over the subset, and the second active manager is compelled to consider the return
2 Sharpe restricts analysis to the case where managers disagree about expected returns but hold a consensus
estimate of covariance.
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and variance of their own portfolio along with its covariance with the remaining
portfolio (that part due to manager one). However this two-step process may be
simpliﬁed if security returns are well described by a factor model, as more recent
literature shows.
Elton and Gruber (2004) present an extension and generalization of Sharpe’s
analysis.3 They view the centralized decision maker as a mean–variance optimizer
who believes that security returns are generated by a set of indices that can be held
as passive portfolios. The central decision maker can build an optimal aggregate
portfolio if active managers are required to hold securities in proportion to their
alpha-to-non-systemic-risk ratio. As long as active managers will tell the central
manager their estimate of alpha for their whole active portfolio, the residual risk
of the active portfolio, and the sensitivities (betas) of the active portfolio relative to
the indices, the central manager can construct an eﬃcient portfolio as a weighted
combination of optimal active and passive portfolios.
Here the central manager can combine overlapping and/or bounded active port-
folios without being told speciﬁc security return forecasts and without a complete
consensus on covariance. This is possible because of the key feature of the system: an
index-based returns process, summarizing covariance information for all investors in
terms of two (or more) passive indices.
Despite the theoretical complexity of coming up with eﬃcient multi-layer port-
folios, there are clear trends in the Australian retirement savings system towards
decentralized investment. In this study we do not aim to extend the theory of decen-
tralized management, but rather to unravel the strands of delegation by which
retirement savings in Australia are invested, and to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
delegation by a series of performance and eﬃciency measures. Section 3 sketches the
features of decentralized management in the Australian pension system.
3 Decentralized management in private pension funds
While pension plan participants are increasingly required to make decisions about
how their assets will be allocated across a menu of investment choices, current prac-
tice in relation to the responsibility for the menu and its composition diﬀers widely.
Under the voluntary company-sponsored 401(k) plans prevalent in the United
States, plan participants are generally oﬀered direct choice among a range of speciﬁc
investment funds.4
Plan sponsors (generally employers) and/or plan administrators decide on the menu
of investment funds and plan participants allocate their assets across the investment
funds oﬀered. The regulatory requirements encourage sponsors to provide a diverse
3 Treynor and Black (1973) derive a CAPM beta model of delegated management.
4 The adequacy and characteristics of investment funds oﬀered to 401(k) participants is analyzed by Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2004). They ﬁnd that for 62% of plans, the menus oﬀered are inadequate and that
over a 20-year period, this would make a diﬀerence in terminal wealth of over 300%. They also ﬁnd that
the investment funds included in the 40(k) plan menus are riskier than the general population of funds in
the same categories, but that the funds included in the plans outperform a menu of randomly selected
funds.
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oﬀering and require that participants be able to ‘exercise independent control ’ over
assets in the account.5
A minimum of three investment options must be oﬀered, each with diﬀerent risk/
return characteristics. Recent surveys of 401(k) plans indicate that the median
number of investment choices is around 10–12 and that the investment funds gener-
ally cover the standard range of asset classes (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2004; Papke,
2004; Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang, 2005). With recent proposals for the reform of US
Social Security emphasizing personal retirement accounts (Cogan and Mitchell,
2003), there has been considerable interest in the menu of investment options in
401(k) plans and its impact on participant choice (Brown and Weisbenner, 2005).6
Since 2000, public pension participants in Sweden have been required to place 2.5
percentage points of their mandatory Premium Pension contributions into individual
accounts. This mandatory retirement saving is organized on a national basis, with a
government agency (the PPM) set up to administer the plan and act as a clearing-
house. Subject to regulatory requirements, which include some restrictions on fee
structure, any investment company licensed to do business in Sweden is allowed to
participate in the system. The menu of investment funds oﬀered to participants has
grown from 460 at commencement in 2000, to over 650 by 2004. From this menu of
(mostly specialized) investment funds, plan participants construct a portfolio of up to
ﬁve investment funds or opt for the default fund. Over 70% of current participants
have made ‘active’ choices (Sunden, 2004; Palme, Sunden, and Sonderlind, 2005).
In Australia, the mandatory superannuation guarantee requires employers to
contribute at least 9% of employees’ incomes into a superannuation (pension) fund.7
Initially, choice of superannuation fund – the trustee structure responsible for
the management and investment of superannuation assets – lay with employers, but,
since July 2005, choice of superannuation fund has been available to employees.
Irrespective of who chooses the superannuation fund, participant investment choice
within a given superannuation fund is both prevalent and increasing. Around 85% of
superannuation assets are in superannuation funds oﬀering investment choice.
The Australian superannuation industry is characterized by considerable diversity
of design and management and this is reﬂected in the extent and composition of
investment choice. The industry can be categorized into three fund types – ‘retail ’
superannuation funds, ‘not-for-proﬁt ’ superannuation funds and ‘self-managed’
superannuation funds. As of March 2005, these accounted for 34%, 43%, and 23%
of total superannuation assets respectively. In terms of investment choice, self-
managed funds allow unlimited choice of investment funds, retail funds generally
oﬀer choice across single manager specialized investment funds, while not-for-proﬁt
superannuation funds oﬀer, as a minimum, choice across multi-manager diversiﬁed
portfolios (typically classiﬁed by the standard options of ‘cash’, ‘capital stable ’,
‘balanced’, ‘growth’, etc.). At March 2005, retail funds oﬀered an average choice of
5 Under section 404(c) of ERISA, a sponsor of a 401(k) plan is not liable for loss or breach of ﬁduciary
responsibility that may result from the participant’s exercise of control over assets.
6 The US President’s 2005 State of the Union address highlighted the need for social security reform and
the beneﬁts of individual accounts with participant-directed investments.
7 ‘Superannuation’ is the commonly used term in Australia for private pensions.
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59 mainly specialized investment funds, while non-proﬁt funds oﬀered choice of seven
mainly multi-manager diversiﬁed portfolios (APRA, 2005).8
In terms of investment management structures, self-managed and retail funds
typically allow members to directly allocate contributions among a menu of (mutual
fund) managers and consequently resemble more closely 401(k) plans in the US and
Premium Pensions in Sweden. By contrast, the majority of non-proﬁt funds operate
an additional layer of investment management via the trustee boards. The remainder
of this paper considers the non-proﬁt sector only.
Superannuation funds operate as trusts and are managed by boards of trustees,
which, for the non-proﬁt sector, are generally required to comprise equal employee
and employer representation. While the duties of trustees include administration,
regulatory compliance, and communication with members, their foremost task
is eﬃcient investment. Legislation speciﬁcally requires trustees to implement an
investment strategy that ‘has regard to … the composition of the fund’s investments
as a whole including the extent to which the investments are or are not diversiﬁed and
the associated risks ’ (APRA, 1999, II.D.1). Hence trustees are expected to coordinate
the choices oﬀered to members and the underlying investment mandates. (From now
on we use the term ‘trustee’ to denote the central investment manager of a non-proﬁt
superannuation fund, and ‘manager ’ to denote a contracted investment agent of the
trustee.)
Figure 1 illustrates a stylized example of investment choices oﬀered to members of
















Cash Capital stable Balanced Growth Asset classes
Figure 1. Structure of decentralized management in non-proﬁt superannuation funds
8 There are, of course, many exceptions to these generalizations. For example, in 2004, the not-for-proﬁt
industry superannuation fund REST oﬀered choice across both multi-manager diversiﬁed options and
multi-manager by asset class; the not-for-proﬁt industry fund Sunsuper oﬀered choice across single and
multi-manager diversiﬁed and specialized options; and the retail superannuation fund AMP Flexible
Lifetime Super oﬀered choice across single- and multi-manager diversiﬁed and specialized options
(Bateman and Hill, 2004).
26 H. Bateman and S. Thorp
diversiﬁed options: cash, capital stable, balanced, or growth (reﬂecting increasing
exposure to riskier asset classes). Many superannuation funds also allow individuals
to design their own combination of speciﬁc asset classes, rather than a ‘pre-mixed’
option. Prospectuses for new members commonly display charts or tables showing
the benchmark asset class weightings underlying each type of account alongside
descriptions of account options. Balanced options, which typically cover domestic
and international ﬁxed interest, equities and cash, are the most popular choice, and
also the most common default (in the event that a new member makes no active
selection).
When members select an investment option, they are instructing trustees on how
their individual accounts should be invested. Once contributions are in the hands of
trustees, however, any clear delineation between account options is submerged into
the mandates comprising the superannuation fund’s investment pool.
In most cases, trustees will engage an asset consultant to advise on the choice of
managers, investment strategies, and allocations. Sometimes, under implemented
consulting arrangements, the asset consultant also engages the investment managers
for the superannuation fund. Having formulated a strategy, trustees then issue con-
tracts or ‘mandates’ to managers, setting out speciﬁc instructions, performance
standards and fees, as noted above. Under current practice, mandates are usually
speciﬁed over a three- to four-year contract period.
This portfolio of investments managed under mandates generate returns that are
eventually passed on to members as crediting rates to their chosen investment options
after deductions for taxes, fees, expenses, and smoothing.
Delegated investment management is increasing and becoming more specialized
(Rainmaker, 2004). Whereas diversiﬁed mandates instruct the manager to invest
across a range of asset classes, specialized mandates restrict the manager to a desig-
nated area of expertise, usually an asset class, subclass, and/or ‘style ’. The responsi-
bility to monitor and manage risk, and diversify eﬀectively, remains with trustees,
even when parts of the investment portfolio are managed under a mandate.
The investment mandates are themselves regulated, and must include explicit
investment constraints, performance, or benchmark standards, reporting and audit-
ing standards, fees and charges schedules, as well as dispute resolution procedures
and termination conditions. However mandates are conﬁdential documents and a
superannuation fund’s underlying investment strategies and fee structures at the level
of individual mandates are not disclosed to members. Most fund members must rely
on trustees’ reports, for investment and fee information.
Rainmaker’s (2004) survey of the delegated investment (mandates) for 269 not-for-
proﬁt superannuation funds, encompassing $204 billion funds under management
(FUM) and including government, industry, and corporate funds identiﬁed a number
of clear trends in mandates. Notably, the majority of FUM in mandates are invested
through delegated managers (93% of the total FUM in the survey), with an average
of 22 mandates per manager and an average mandate size of $65 million. The average
number of mandates per superannuation fund has doubled over the past six years to
12, but some funds issue many more mandates (over 50). Not surprisingly, large
superannuation funds issue more mandates than small funds (at a ratio of about four
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to one), and funds employing asset consultants issue about twice as many mandates
as those which do not.
The trend towards specialized mandates is evident with the percentage of diversi-
ﬁed mandates (covering a range of asset classes and styles) falling from 50 to 15 over
the past six years.
Asset consultants play a crucial role in the delegated management process, and the
consulting industry is becoming more concentrated. While there are 22 asset con-
sultants advising Australian superannuation funds, the ten largest consulting ﬁrms
control 97% of the funds under asset consultant advice. In addition, the number of
asset consultants has almost halved in the past ﬁve years as consultants themselves
specialize in the types of superannuation funds they advise.
In comparing the Australian non-proﬁt superannuation funds with international
experience, we see that the non-proﬁt funds typically use an additional layer of
investment management so that the investment decisions of members pass through
two layers of delegation. At one level, members can choose to allocate their assets/
contributions across a number of multi-manager diversiﬁed portfolios. But at the
next level, decisions about the investment managers (mandates) operationalizing
these choices are made by trustees and their consultants.
4 Empirical evaluation
We look at the question of decentralized management eﬃciency from two perspec-
tives : we ﬁrst compare the performance of one non-proﬁt fund against another,
gathering information on whether there are measurable diﬀerences between them
according to the number of mandates they issue; then we compare existing
funds against a number of performance standards, via a series of spanning tests and
simulations.
4.1 Data
There is no oﬃcial collection of data on delegated investment patterns among
pension funds in Australia. However, Rainmaker Information,9 a private, industry
research house, collects data on a wide range of fund characteristics, including
mandate patterns, for not-for-proﬁt superannuation funds, representing around 90%
of the not-for-proﬁt share of the superannuation sector. These data are self-reported
by the superannuation funds to Rainmaker at quarterly frequency and collected into
a proprietary electronic database which is marketed by subscription to interested
researchers. We selected 198 of the funds represented in the 2004 database on the
basis of the size of funds under management and the mandate record’s coverage of
the fund’s total portfolio allocation. The mandate records show the percentage of
each fund’s portfolio allocated to a speciﬁc manager.10 We hold patterns of allocation
derived from the mandate data constant throughout the three-year sample, since for
9 Rainmaker (2004) provides a more detailed description of the mandate database.
10 For 12 funds in our sample, we had records of the managers employed by the fund but not the pro-
portion of assets allocated to each manager. We assumed that assets were allocated equally among
managers for these funds.
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our sample we have only one set of mandate records currently available and in any
case the average length of a mandate contract is three years.
The number of mandates per fund in our sample ranges from 59 to 1. The
ﬁrst, second, and third quartile markers for the mandate distribution fall at 5, 12,
and 21 mandates, so for the purposes of easier comparison, we also divide the
funds into four (unequal) groups. The ﬁrst group includes 45 funds with 22–59
mandates, the second includes 46 funds with 13–21 mandates, the third group
includes 52 funds with 6–12 mandates, and the fourth group includes 55 funds with
1–5 mandates.
Size of fund and mandate number are positively correlated (r=0.46) as is
evident in Figure 2, but there are a number of large funds with few mandates and
vice versa.
In addition, Rainmaker supplied historical monthly returns data for 468 special-
ized and diversiﬁed investment funds, encompassing most of the managers employed
by superannuation fund trustees from January 2002 to December 2004. In the
Rainmaker database, mandates are identiﬁed by manager name and asset class.
The 11 separate asset class identiﬁers which Rainmaker uses are representative of
the investment patterns of Australian superannuation funds according to oﬃcial
statistical collections (see APRA, 2005). Where possible, we make a precise match
between mandate and manager; an exact match is possible with 61% of mandates.
Where we cannot make a precise match, we substitute a proxy return based on an
average return to all managers in that asset class, or, in the case of cash and private
equity, we substitute an index return. In addition, since diversiﬁed fund returns are
reported net of fees but specialized funds are not, we add back the equivalent of 0.5%
per annum to returns to diversiﬁed funds to account for fee deductions. Hence all
manager returns (and therefore fund returns) are reported gross of all investment
fees. Table 1 sets out the asset classes and proxies.
We combine mandate weights and manager returns to compute a monthly port-
folio return for each of the 198 superannuation funds, for the sample period January





















Figure 2. Mandate number and size of superannuation fund
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fund portfolio returns are therefore a mandate-weighted average of the manager
returns and/or its proxies.11
4.2 Do risk-adjusted returns rise with the number of delegated managers?
We begin by looking at the return and risk proﬁle of each of the 198 individual funds
in the sample, listed by the number of mandates they issue, then review the per-
formance of the four quartile groups where group 1 has the most and group 4 the
least mandates. We assume that the aim of superannuation funds in issuing mandates
is to improve risk-adjusted return (net of fees) to investment, either through diversi-
ﬁcation of judgment, so that negative impacts from prediction errors of any single
active manager are lessened by adding managers to the central fund, and/or through
diversiﬁcation of style, so that the active skills of specialist managers are combined.
If these strategies are eﬀective, we would expect to see smoother and higher returns
among funds issuing more mandates.
It is natural to expect that costs are higher for superannuation funds with more
mandates, due to the higher administrative costs of tendering for, and keeping track
of, more mandates. We also expect higher investment fees as greater specialization
and expertise are required from managers, and as the superannuation fund assets
are broken down into smaller sub-groups, possibly lowering economies of scale.
We currently do not have the relevant data to address these important issues so we
restrict our investigation to returns comparisons. To the extent that diﬀerences
between investment returns and crediting rates to members’ accounts are a guide to
fees and costs, some indication is provided in Section 4.5.






Australian Equity 114 Average of managers 7.58%
Australian Fixed 47 Average of managers 1.39%
Property 49 Average of managers 11.30%
International Equity 121 Average of managers x7.64%
International Fixed 26 Average of managers 3.43%
Hedge 5 Average of managers 13.75%
Diversiﬁed 107 Average of balanced
diversiﬁed managers
5.61%
Private Equity – Datastream Australian
small cap equities index
12.65%
Cash – Datastream Bank
Bills index
4.99%
Foreign Currency – Assumed zero 0%
Other – Average of balanced
diversiﬁed managers
5.61%
11 We therefore cannot claim that our calculated returns match the true gross returns to any fund precisely.
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Individual funds
Figure 3 shows average annual investment returns over the three years to December
2004 for all 198 non-proﬁt superannuation funds. The average annual return across
all funds in the sample was 6.65%, with the highest return above 12% and the lowest
return under 3%. The mean return appears to decline as mandate numbers decrease,
suggesting that mandate numbers are positively correlated with investment returns.
(This result will be shown more precisely when we review group performance below.)
Risk levels do not show a clear trend (Figure 4), being centered on an average of
6% p.a., with the most risky fund showing a standard deviation slightly below 9%,
and the least risky, a standard deviation close to 2.5%. Funds in the 6–12 mandates













































Figure 4. Standard deviation of monthly individual superannuation
fund returns
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Figure 5 illustrates the return to risk ratios, showing a small downward trend
and/or break around the 12 mandates mark, and indeed the average return to risk
ratio for funds with more than 12 mandates is 1.3, while the average for funds with 12
or fewer is 1.0.
Overall fund with fund comparison points to beneﬁts from diversifying across
more manager mandates. However, the returns and risk are not linearly related to
number of mandates, since the most unpredictable and potentially poor outcomes are
in the 6–12 mandates region, and the best risk-adjusted outcomes are in the 13–21
mandates region.
Grouped funds
The small number of time series observations available for each superannuation
fund portfolio makes more rigorous testing diﬃcult at the individual fund level.
We would like to take the testing further, so we arbitrarily divide the funds into
approximate quartiles (as outlined in Section 4.1), stacking returns for all the funds in
each division, and artiﬁcially creating four series of portfolio returns.12 Table 2 sets
out summary statistics for each of the four groups of funds. Mean returns are highest
for the funds with the most mandates and least for the funds with the least mandates,
but standard deviations do not decline evenly as mandate numbers increase: the
13–21 mandate group is least risky, and the 6–12 mandate group is most risky.
Negative skewness (indicating a long left tail in the returns distribution) gets worse as
mandate numbers increase from 6 to 59, but kurtosis seems unrelated to mandates.13
One implication of diversiﬁcation across managers is that returns should be less
volatile as trustees diversify across specialists. To formally compare the volatility of
diﬀerent mandate groups we test for signiﬁcant diﬀerence between realized vola-






























Figure 5. Ratio of annual return to standard deviation by individual
superannuation fund
12 Stacking returns in blocks preserves temporal dependence across the four groups.
13 In a related study into equity fund of funds in Australia, Brands and Gallagher (2003) ﬁnd that negative
skewness and kurtosis worsen as managers are added to a fund of equity funds.
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at each time period, t, in the sample, for each of the groups i=1, …, 4. Returns are













The null hypothesis is that the mean of each (mt
ij) series is zero, indicating that no
reduction in portfolio volatility accrues as mandates are added to portfolios. We test
this hypothesis by a t-test on the coeﬃcient b in the regression mt
ij=bi+et where i is a
vector of ones (Table 3). The ﬁrst column reports tests of volatility of group 4 less
volatility of groups 3, 2, and 1. Positive values indicate that the variance of group 4 is
Table 3. Diﬀerence in portfolio variance, Groups 1–4
Estimated coeﬃcients in the regression of mij on a constant, where mij is the diﬀerence between
realized volatility of portfolio i and portfolio j at each observation. A signiﬁcant positive
value indicates that the variance of portfolio i exceeds the variance of portfolio j. A signiﬁcant
negative value indicates that the variance of portfolio i is smaller than the variance of
portfolio j. t-statistics are based on robust (Newey–West) standard errors.
Portfolio j
Portfolio i
1–5 Mandates 6–12 Mandates 13–21 Mandates
Coeﬃcient t-stat Coeﬃcient t-stat Coeﬃcient t-stat
6–12 Mandates x0.056 –0.496
13–21 Mandates 0.457 3.880 0.648 6.182
22–59 Mandates 0.179 1.806 0.383 4.048 x0.281 –3.061
Table 2. Summary statistics, pooled monthly returns, annualized
Statistics calculated from annualized monthly returns for all superannuation funds in each
group. Group 1 includes 1620 observations, Group 2 includes 1656, Group 3 includes 1872,
and Group 4 includes 1980 observations.









Mean 9.87 9.17 8.45 8.14
Median 12.61 11.46 11.07 11.17
Std. Dev. 6.08 5.82 6.30 6.18
Reward to risk 1.62 1.58 1.34 1.32
Skewness x0.32 x0.28 x0.24 x0.31
Kurtosis 2.32 2.36 2.32 2.31
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larger than the comparison group, and negative values indicate the reverse.
Signiﬁcantly smaller variances are obtained in the two largest mandate groups, but
there is no signiﬁcant volatility diﬀerence between groups 3 and 4. Funds with 13–21
mandates have smaller volatility than funds with 22–59 mandates, as shown by the
signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient in the last column. Overall, the least risky returns are
obtained in the 13–21 mandate range, with no signiﬁcant reduction in risk from more
mandates. In addition, moving from the 1–5 to the 6–12 range creates no signiﬁcant
improvement for investors.
Retirement savers are interested in both return and risk, so we shift focus to tests of
stochastic dominance. Our aim is to test whether diﬀerences between realized port-
folio returns are likely to matter to a risk-averse investor, or whether in fact investors
would be indiﬀerent between the groups. For any two samples of portfolio returns
mif g and m jf g with cumulative distributions (CDFs) G and F, portfolio i will be
preferred by portfolio j by any agent whose utility over returns exhibits risk aversion




0 F(t)dt for all m.
The null hypothesis to be tested is that G weakly dominates F in the second degree.
The CDFs are evaluated at all points in the support.14 Under the null hypothesis, the
test statistic is no greater than zero. The sampling distribution of the test statistic is
generated by a block bootstrap.15
Table 4 reports test results. We establish the dominance of portfolio returns i over j
when the null hypothesis is accepted for i tested against j but rejected when the
hypothesis is reversed. If we can reject neither null, the test is inconclusive. Returns
from the 22–59 mandates group dominate returns from all other groups, and would
be preferred by risk-averse agents. Group 2 is also clearly preferred to the few-
mandates groups, but we found no clear ordering over returns to the 1–5 and 6–12
groups.
Table 4. Tests for second degree stochastic dominance, Groups 1–4
Test that portfolio i dominates portfolio j in the second degree in the left-hand column and
corresponding test that portfolio j dominates portfolio i in the right-hand column. A high
p-value indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis that i dominates j (or the reverse).
Signiﬁcant p-values are marked with an asterisk.
Portfolio j
Portfolio i
1–5 Mandates 6–12 Mandates 13–21 Mandates
p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
6–12 Mandates 0.12 0.46
13–21 Mandates 0.00** 0.88 0.00** 0.82
22–59 Mandates 0.00** 0.89 0.00** 0.83 0.03* 0.26
14 We refer the reader to Barrett and Donald (2003) for an explicit discussion of the test statistic and its
sampling distribution.
15 We use the block bootstrap method of Lim, Maasoumi, and Martin (2004) to allow for contempor-
aneous and serial dependence in the data, with block size dT, where T is the number of observations.
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Comparing group with group shows advantages to members of funds who invest in
13 or more managers. These funds show signiﬁcantly less volatility and overall higher
returns than the funds choosing less than 13 mandates. However at the lower end of
the spectrum, no signiﬁcant advantages accrue to member of funds who choose be-
tween 6–12 managers rather than a small number, or even one, diversiﬁed manager.
4.3 Do decentralized funds do better than standard index returns?
The essence of performance assessment is to ‘ investigate whether a fund manager
helps enlarge the investment opportunity set faced by the investing public and, if
so, to what extent the manager enlarges it ’ (Chen and Knez, 1996). To make this
measurement we need to test the funds here against a benchmark or proxy for the
investment opportunity set faced by an unrestricted superannuation investor or
trustee, rather than simply comparing one fund against another.16
Benchmark selection
Our goal in choosing a benchmark is to span as eﬃciently as possible the investment
opportunity set faced by trustees. As a minimum we expect that the portfolios oﬀered
by superannuation trustees should be as eﬃcient as one which any well-informed
trustee could construct from the universe of available mutual funds. Following Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2004), we choose a set of asset class indices as a proxy for passive
investment in well-diversiﬁed portfolios of equities, property, ﬁxed interest, and cash.
(Table 5 gives summary statistics, and a full description of sources is given in
Appendix A.) We include both domestic and international equities and ﬁxed interest




Dev. Max Min Skewness Kurtosis
Australian
Equities Large-cap 5.83 5.38 12.24 27.14 x16.52 x0.01 1.90
Mid-cap 17.97 19.78 11.13 43.84 x1.65 0.06 2.37
Small-cap 12.65 13.42 16.51 38.96 x14.37 x0.08 1.62
Value 6.07 5.90 10.95 27.65 x11.95 0.20 2.10
Growth 6.82 8.60 14.19 28.98 x19.60 x0.13 1.79
Property Listed 16.23 14.40 6.83 32.39 7.72 1.11 3.22
Fixed interest Composite 5.72 5.14 2.51 11.05 2.05 0.42 2.09
Indexed 7.20 6.83 3.05 14.61 2.27 0.36 2.42
Cash Bank Bills 4.99 4.92 0.29 5.62 4.63 0.88 2.66
International
Equities World x8.17 x10.19 16.49 20.66 x33.27 0.11 1.58
Emerging 5.61 5.85 18.28 40.71 x28.01 x0.04 2.30
Fixed interest Government 8.01 7.31 2.74 14.25 2.92 0.55 2.70
16 As noted earlier, the option of direct investment of retirement saving into passive index funds is available
to Australians who are members of retail and/or self-managed superannuation funds.
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indices: we divide domestic equities by size and value/growth divisions, and domestic
ﬁxed interest securities into composite and indexed classes. Of the asset-class indices
tested, listed property has the highest average, and world equity markets the lowest
average returns over the sample. Returns to these indices represent gross investment
returns to well-diversiﬁed investments in each asset class before fees. Since the
superannuation fund returns are also gross of fees, index returns are comparable.
The asset classes making up the benchmark are representative of the investment
patterns of Australian superannuation funds according to oﬃcial statistical collec-
tions (see APRA, 2005).
Spanning tests : mandate funds
The set of benchmark returns is used in two sets of tests. Firstly we test whether any
superannuation fund portfolio spans the space of the index returns. In other words,
we test whether an investor holding a superannuation portfolio could do no better in
risk-adjusted terms by adding (long positions in) the benchmark indices to his or her
portfolio, following De Roon et al. (2001). The null hypothesis is that
aif0 (2)
where the test statistic for ai is the vector of constants from the regression of excess
returns to the benchmark indices rb,t on excess returns to the fund portfolio ri,t. The
null hypothesis is written as an inequality to account for superannuation investment
rules restricting funds to long-only investments. (Conventional spanning tests do not
restrict the sign of portfolio weights.) If ai=0, then the superannuation fund port-
folio is as eﬃcient as any (long-only) linear combination of the indices.
We run the least-squares regressions of index excess returns on each super-
annuation fund excess return
rb, t=ai+biri, t+et, (3)
computing 12 equations for each of the 198 superannuation funds. We then test the
null hypothesis that constants from the 12 equations are jointly zero via a Wald test
using a Newey–West (1987) covariance matrix.17 (Results are reported in Figure 6.)
We use critical values for the Wald test that allow for the inequality constraint, as
discussed by De Roon et al. (2001) and derived by Kodde and Palm (1986).
Test results set out in Figure 6 indicate that none of the 198 fund portfolios
spanned the space of index returns, which may indicate restricted or ineﬃcient
decentralized management.
As an alternative, we conduct the same spanning test against an equally weighted
portfolio of indices.18 In this case the null hypothesis that a=0 against an alternative
a>0 can be tested by a one-tailed t-test, and results are shown in Figure 7.19 Where
the t-statistic falls below the critical value of 1.69, we infer that the fund portfolio
does at least as well as an equally weighted benchmark portfolio of indices. Of the
17 See Gourieroux et al. (1982), Kodde and Palm (1986) and De Roon et al. (2001).
18 On the eﬃciency of equally weighted portfolios, see Demiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2005).
19 Here we automatically impose the short-sales constraint by constructing an equally weighted portfolio of
benchmark assets.

















Figure 6. Unrestricted spanning tests of individual fund portfolios against
asset class indices
Graph of Wald test statistics for the null hypothesis that constants in
the regressions of indices against individual superannuation fund portfolios
are jointly zero, i.e. that superannuation fund portfolios span the asset
class indices. Critical value under short-sales constraint with 12 degrees of
freedom is 20.47 according to Kodde and Palm (1986), indicating that the
















Figure 7. Spanning test of individual superannuation fund portfolios
against an equally weighted portfolio of indices
Graph of t-test statistics where values below 1.69 (one-tailed 5% critical
value) indicate spanning. Null hypothesis is that the constant from the re-
gression of returns to an equally weighted portfolio of indices on returns to
individual superannuation fund portfolios is zero, i.e. that fund portfolios
span the equally weighted index portfolio.
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198 funds, 46 span the equally weighted benchmark, mainly funds from the higher
mandate groupings. In fact, almost half of the 22–59 mandate group span the equally
weighted benchmark, and more than one third of the 13–21 mandate group (See
Figure 7). However, in terms of terminal wealth over 20 years, a superannuation
portfolio which returned the average of the 198 represented here would generate
around 16% less than funds invested in the equally weighted benchmark portfolio.
In summary, superannuation fund portfolio returns appear less eﬃcient than an
optimally weighted long-only portfolio of indices, but about one quarter of super-
annuation funds perform at least as well as an equally weighted portfolio of indices.
Funds having more than 13 mandates are more likely to match equally weighted
benchmark performance, and the probability of matching the index rises as mandates
rise above 21.
4.4 Do fund trustees choose managers with skill ?
To gauge the ability of trustees to choose from the universe of investment managers
we test randomly selected portfolios from the investment manager pool against the
equally weighted benchmark. There are a total of 362 specialized investment
managers whose returns are available in the Rainmaker database. Of these, 114 are
Australian equities managers, 47 are Australian ﬁxed interest managers, 49 are
Australian property managers, 121 are international equities managers, 26 are inter-
national ﬁxed interest managers, and ﬁve are hedge funds. (We leave diversiﬁed
managers out of the simulation.) We form 100 random selections of pre-speciﬁed size
from this pool of managers and then compute equally weighted portfolio returns
using realized returns for the randomly selected managers. We test returns from
simulated portfolios against the returns from an equally weighted benchmark for
spanning, and we report the proportion of the 100 simulations for which we could not
reject the null hypothesis of a=0 against the one-sided alternative a>0.
In the ﬁrst round we allow random selections from the pool of investment man-
agers to be unconstrained, with all managers equally likely to be selected (Table 6).
Unconstrained random selection does mean, however, that the asset classes with the
highest representation in the Rainmaker manager pool are most likely to be selected.
Since the largest group is international equity managers, which generated poor
returns over this sample, it is perhaps not surprising to ﬁnd that when we add more
managers to a portfolio, performance against the benchmark worsens.
Table 6. Proportion of funds in each mandate group which span an equally





Group 1: 22–59 mandates 21 47
Group 2: 13–21 mandates 16 35
Group 3: 6–12 mandates 7 13
Group 4: 1–5 mandates 2 4
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Compared with the actual outcomes for the superannuation portfolios, however,
the random selection process uncovers some interesting features. The proportion
of portfolios spanning the equally weighted index portfolio is much higher among
random selections in the 6–12 manager (mandate) range (above 30%) than it is
among actual superannuation portfolios in this mandate range (13%). By contrast,
randomly selected portfolios in the 13–21 range show lower likelihood of spanning
than the actual superannuation portfolios in this range (29% as compared with
35%), and given the downward trend in the random selection spanning rates, the
top-end group of actual superannuation portfolios did better.
In the second round (see Table 7) we forced the allocation to include at least one
randomly selected investment manager from Australian equity, ﬁxed interest, and
property, and international equity and ﬁxed interest. After selecting a manager from
each of those asset class groups, we added managers at random without restrictions.
Forcing asset class diversiﬁcation greatly increases the likelihood that a randomly
selected portfolio of managers will test well against the equally weighted benchmark,
but again the likelihood of spanning declines as managers are added. The perform-
ance of the actual superannuation portfolios is worse than the asset-class-diversiﬁed
random selections for all but the high-mandate group.
To summarize, these simulation exercises indicate that trustees of superannuation
funds with more than 13 mandates did better than a randomly selected, equally
weighted portfolio, drawing from the same pool of investment managers. Results
were less convincing when we constrained random selections to minimal asset
class diversiﬁcation. In that case, only the superannuation funds with the largest
Table 7. Spanning tests of randomly selected portfolios of investment funds
Random selection of investment funds were made from the mandate manager pool and formed
into equally weighted portfolios. The ﬁrst column reports the proportion of these funds
spanning the equally weighted portfolio of indices from 100 hundred simulations where any
combination of investment managers could be chosen. The second column reports the pro-
portion of these funds spanning when the random selections were constrained to choose at least
one manager from Australian equity, ﬁxed interest and property, and international equity and
ﬁxed interest, and then make random selections for remaining funds.
Number of funds
per portfolio
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number of mandates could perform better than equally weighted, diversiﬁed random
selection.
We can think of these choices as analogous to an uninformed individual selecting
from a 401(k) plan menu. These results show that trustee selections are no better over
this sample than a random application of a simple diversiﬁcation strategy, choosing a
manager from each asset class and building an equally weighted portfolio.
4.5 Investment returns and member account crediting
Of ultimate concern to superannuation fund members is not the raw investment
returns available to trustees for distribution, but returns credited to member
accounts. Here we compare averages of reported crediting rates for the year to June
2004, with the annual raw investment return gained over the same year.20 Series for
individual funds are shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8 shows that the correlation between gross investment returns and crediting
rates is remarkably weak at the individual fund level (correlation coeﬃcient is 0.12).
Accounting for some gap between investment returns and crediting rates is not
so diﬃcult : manager fees, taxes, administrative expenses, and other costs all may
contribute to diﬀerences between investment earnings and crediting rates. What is

















crediting rates investment returns
Figure 8. Reported crediting rate and investment return for the year to
June 2004
Crediting rates calculated as a value-weighted average of crediting
rates to member ‘options’ where values were available ; otherwise as an
equally weighted average of reported crediting rates. Funds not report-
ing any crediting rates were omitted. Investment returns calculated as a
value-weighted average of returns to individual mandates.
Source : Rainmaker database.
20 Most superannuation funds report crediting rates annually. The self-reported crediting rates shown in
Figures 8 and 9 are taken from Rainmaker Marketplace. Where information on the proportion of total
funds held in each account option was available, the crediting rate is a weighted average of separate
account crediting rates. If funds did not report option weights, then a simple average of crediting rates is
reported.
40 H. Bateman and S. Thorp
basis, since one would expect most not-for-proﬁt superannuation funds to face
similar taxes, fees, and expenses, conditional on asset allocation.21
Grouping the funds and averaging as we do in Figure 9 smooths away the
volatility, but exposes another anomaly: while the 22–59 mandate group generates
the highest gross investment return, it does no better on crediting rates than the 1–5
mandate group (11.8 as compared with 11.75% p.a.). The lowest crediting rates
apply to the 6–12 mandate group (10.21% p.a.), but the actual variation from group
to group is small.
We cannot draw a strong conclusion from this single and approximate data point,
but these results do raise doubts as to how much of any diversiﬁcation beneﬁts from
mandate proliferation is being passed on to members of superannuation funds.
5 Conclusions
Theory suggests that the task of combining decentralized investments is diﬃcult
without full information and is likely to lead to ineﬃciencies except under special
conditions. Managers of large pools of funds in ﬁnancial markets behave as if the
opposite were true. In the USA, for example, sponsors and administrators of 401(k)
plans act as a ﬁlter on the mutual fund industry, selecting a group of managers
that plan members may invest in. For Australia, the trustees of not-for-proﬁt super-
annuation funds are responsible for investing contributions, and increasingly have
delegated to specialized investment managers via investment mandates. In this study
we evaluate the additional layer of management undertaken by non-proﬁt pension




















crediting rates investment returns
Figure 9. Average of crediting rates and investment returns for large to
small mandate groups
Crediting rates and investment returns calculated according to data in
Figure 3 and averaged across each mandate group.
Source : Rainmaker database.
21 Reserving and returns smoothing are not likely explanations of the weak relationship evident in Figure 8.
A regression (not reported here) of the 2004 crediting rate on investment returns from the current and
previous two years did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant relationship between 2004 crediting rates and investment
returns from 2003 and 2002.
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Using a unique data set from Rainmaker Information, we create mandate-based
investment portfolio returns for 198 not-for-proﬁt superannuation funds, generating
36 monthly investment returns for each fund for the three years to December 2004.
Firstly, we establish a positive link between higher investment returns and
higher numbers of delegated management, but the relationship is not linear. Results
of portfolio against portfolio comparisons suggest that superannuation fund trustee
boards which employ more than 13 managers did better on a risk-adjusted-return
basis than funds with fewer managers. The diﬀerences in risk are statistically signiﬁ-
cant between the groups with 13 or more managers and those with less, but no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence can be detected for those funds with 6–12 managers and those with
fewer. Worst performance over the sample period is associated with funds that had
6–12 managers.
Secondly, the combined portfolios of delegated investments do not appear to
span an optimally invested portfolio of asset-class indices. When we compare super-
annuation portfolio returns with returns to a group of standard asset class indices,
spanning tests showed that none of the 198 funds were as eﬃcient as an optimally
long-weighted portfolio of indices. Superannuation portfolios with 22–59 mandates
did perform as well as an equally weighted portfolio of indices in about 50% of cases,
and about 30% of cases for portfolios made up of 13–21 mandates. This compares
with the ﬁndings of Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) that about 38% of 401(k) plans
in their sample spanned the returns space of eight asset class indices.
Thirdly, when we build portfolios of randomly selected investment managers from
the pool available to superannuation fund trustees, results show that actual super-
annuation portfolios with many mandates did better than the randomly generated
equally weighted portfolios, but those with fewer mandates did worse. However
once we constrain the randomly generated portfolios to match minimal asset class
diversiﬁcation, actual portfolio performance was rarely better than chance selection.
Results show that actual trustee selections are not signiﬁcantly better over this sample
than a simple diversiﬁcation strategy of choosing at least one manager from each
asset class at random.
Taken as a whole, the evidence for mandate-based delegated investment in the
Australian retirement savings system is mixed. Compared with other superannuation
funds, funds with very high rates of mandate issuance add value in gross risk-adjusted
returns, and probably perform as well as an equally weighted benchmark portfolio.
However these advantages appear to accrue only to funds with very large and
sophisticated delegation structures. On the contrary, adding a few specialist managers
to a passively diversiﬁed portfolio does not appear to improve it and does no better
than random selection over the sample we investigate. What is not at all clear at
this stage of research is the extent to which gains to mandated investment are diluted
by the higher expense of engaging and administering large and complex portfolios.
Data constraints have so far prevented us conducting a rigorous comparison
between crediting rates to members’ retirement savings accounts and actual
investment returns, but using the little data that is available raises some puzzles.
The correlation between crediting rates and investment returns is very low at the
individual fund level. When we pool investment returns and crediting rates into
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quartile mandate groups, we ﬁnd that diversiﬁcation gains from employing more
investment managers may be being consumed in fees, costs, or smoothing. We plan to
unpack the links between actual crediting rates and gross investment returns in future
research.
Finally, we plan to extend this analysis to the Australian retail superannuation
sector which does not employ trustees to select managers. Instead, retail fund
members directly allocate savings across a menu of investment options in a manner
closer to participants in 401(k) plans. In future research we will compare the relative
merits of trustee-directed with member-selected investment for pension funds within
the same jurisdiction.
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Appendix A: Benchmark data
Australia :
’ Large-cap equities : S&P/ASX 50 total returns index ASX5LD(RI)yA$,
DataStream
’ Mid-cap equities : S&P/ASX MIDCAP50 total returns index ASXM50I(RI)y
A$, DataStream
’ Small-cap equities : ASX Small ordinaries total returns index ASXSORD(RI)
yA$, DataStream
’ Value equities : MSCI Australia Value Gross Index, local currency, MSCI
http://www.msci.com/equity/index2.html
’ Growth equities : MSCI Australia Growth Gross Index, local currency, MSCI
http://www.msci.com/equity/index2.html
’ Property: GPR General PSI Australia total returns index GPRGALL(RI)
yA$, DataStream
’ Cash: UBS Australian Bank Bills ABNKBLI(PI)yA$, DataStream
’ Fixed Interest composite : UBS Composite All Maturities total returns index,
ACIALL(RI)yA$, DataStream
’ Fixed Interest indexed: UBS Govt. Inﬂation All Maturities total returns index,
AIALLM(RI)yA$, DataStream
International :
’ World equities : World ex Australia Gross Index, local currency, MSCI http://
www.msci.com/equity/index2.html
’ Emerging markets: MSCI Emerging markets total returns index,
MSEMKF$(RI)yA$, DataStream
’ Fixed Interest : Salomon Bros. CGBIWGBI All Maturities (A$ Hedged)
SBWGTCA(RI)yA$, DataStream
Risk-free rates :
’ Australian 30 day Bank Bill rate, endmonth, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin
Database, http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/index.html#table_f
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